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Abstract 
This paper presents a computational method to organize agent-based E-commerce negotiations with adaptive negotiation 
behaviors aiming at enhancing the negotiation power and flexibility of software agents to alleviate human involvements in E-
commerce negotiations. Firstly, the computational expression of E-commerce negotiation, including negotiation issues and 
strategies, is specified to assist agents’ computing functions. Then, an adaptive negotiation behavior configuration mechanism is 
proposed to tackle the negotiation dynamics through computation. In this three-staged mechanism, agents’ negotiation behaviors 
are deployed by a case-based strategy assignment mechanism before the starting of negotiation; then along the on-going 
negotiation sequence, opponents’ negotiation behaviors are tracked through Back-Propagation Neural Network (BP_NN) 
learning model to make strategy adjustment to confront the opponent. After the negotiation, opponents’ concession functions are 
recorded and analysed using time series measure. Finally, the feasibility of the BP_NN learning model is verified through a set of 
tests. The computational negotiation method is exemplified using a two-issue buyer-seller negotiation case. The outcomes show 
that the adaptive negotiation behavior configuration mechanism can benefit an agent to win more in the E-commerce negotiation. 
Keywords: E-commerce; negotiation; agent; case-based reasoning; neural network 
1. Introduction
Negotiation is an effective communication approach to solve transaction conflicts and make better deals between
trading entities in the commerce world. Under the flourishing development of E-commerce, negotiations should also 
be moved to the electronic channel. E-commerce negotiations involve different forms of B2B (e.g., bidding for 
contracts in a virtual enterprise), B2C (e.g., deliberating customized options in an online shop operated by a 
company) and C2C (e.g., bargaining price with an individual in a C2C website platform). Human operation-based E-
commerce negotiations always relate to iterative online interactions with delayed waiting time. If this function can 
be designated to some kind of software entity, it will be a preferable situation to alleviate human efforts and reduce 
the time consumed. Concerning this potential, agent technology has been increasingly explored to automate 
negotiations [1-3]. A software agent is a computational entity which perceives, acts upon its environment, and is 
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autonomous in its behavior [4]. Equipped with negotiation functionalities, agents can perform on behalves of their 
owners to make decisions. Some agent-assisted E-commerce negotiation test beds, such as the MIT Media Lab’s 
Kasbah [5], the Michigan InternetAuctionBot [6] and the MAGNET [7] have provided the vision of using software 
agents to conduct one-round auction-type negotiations. These early attempts focus more on the illustration of the 
whole market mechanism with allocation of agent roles, while the behavior dynamics of agents are rather simple. 
For further development and achieving better performance in multi-round iterative negotiations, agents’ negotiation 
behaviors should be adaptive and dynamic towards various and changeable negotiation environments.  
As computational entities, agents’ negotiation behaviors are based on some computational models. There are 
three fundamental areas need to be considered when designing a computational negotiation model: negotiation 
issues, negotiation protocol and negotiation strategies [1]. Negotiation issues confine the negotiation items on which 
mutual agreement is aimed to be achieved. The negotiation protocol defines the “rule of encounter” between agents 
[8]. Negotiation strategies guide agents’ negotiation behaviors through combinations of tactics [1]. Since multiple 
negotiation parties (e.g., one-buyer-one-seller, one-buyer-many-sellers or many-buyers-one-seller) and many 
negotiation issues (e.g., price, lead time, warranty, etc.) are always involved in E-commerce negotiations, some 
bilateral or multi-lateral agent negotiation models embracing certain negotiation protocols have been proposed to 
govern multi-issue negotiations [8-10]. Among these negotiation models, the concurrent one-to-one iterative bidding 
negotiation model is an effective method to organize multiple agents taking the roles of buyers or sellers. However, 
concerning an individual negotiation agent, its negotiation behavior is simple and non-adaptive in these models, 
which means its negotiation strategy is not decided according to specific negotiation environment and cannot be 
readjusted towards on-going negotiation dynamics. Since most E-commerce negotiations are not fully cooperative 
and are of win-lose relationships, adaptive negotiation behavior will benefit a negotiation agent to win more against 
its opponents through more delicate observation of the negotiation situation.  
Current researches have developed some learning models facilitating agents’ adaptive negotiation behaviors. 
These learning models are mostly based on the learning and prediction of the negotiation opponent’s behaviors, 
using methods such as the neural network, nonlinear regression analysis and hierarchical clustering [11-14]. 
However, the offline-learning and online-learning models are separately treated; thereby the accuracy of the learning 
models and the real-time response to dynamic changes cannot be achieved at the same time. Meanwhile, further 
processing of the learning data have not been examined to nurture new cycles of negotiations.  
The objective of this paper is to configure a generic computational model for agent-based automated negotiations 
to alleviate human involvements in E-commerce negotiations. The adaptability of negotiation behaviors in the 
model is enhanced to benefit the negotiation agent to win more against its opponents through more delicate 
observation of the negotiation situation. The model can be used to build negotiation functionalities of an individual 
negotiation agent involved in any form of E-commerce negotiations (B2B, B2C and C2C). In this model, both 
quantitative and qualitative negotiation issues are expressed in a computable manner. A three-staged mechanism is 
proposed to configure agents’ negotiation behaviors adaptively throughout an entire negotiation cycle. In the pre-
negotiation stage, agents’ negotiation behaviors are deployed by a case-based strategy assignment mechanism. In the 
on-going negotiation stage, negotiation opponents’ behaviors are tracked through the neural network and the self 
negotiation strategy may be adjusted according to the tracking results. In the post-negotiation stage, negotiation 
opponents’ concession functions will be recorded and analysed using time series measure for future negotiation 
references. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the computational expression of 
negotiation issues and strategies in agent-based E-commerce negotiations. Section 3 illustrates the three-staged 
adaptive negotiation behavior configuration mechanism. Experiments and tests are presented in section 4. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
2. Computational Expression for E-commerce Negotiations 
To enable agents to negotiate automatically through computing functions, all the related negotiation knowledge 
such as negotiation issues, negotiation strategies and concession tactics must be expressed in a computable manner.  
2.1. Negotiation issues 
In E-commerce negotiations, buyers and sellers often need to negotiate over a set of considering terms to attain a 
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mutual acceptable solution. Price is the most frequently concerned issue. Sellers always announce a higher price, 
while buyers desire lower price. Lead time is another important issue when goods are not immediately available and 
need some time to be delivered. Buyers may need the goods to be delivered as soon as possible, while sellers may 
require longer time to prepare them. When the product quality issue is considered, at a certain price level, buyers 
require products with higher quality or more advanced functions, while sellers can only afford products with lower 
quality or limited functions. Other negotiation issues may involve the payment pattern, the transportation method, 
the package mode, the penalty terms and so on. To make a deal or contract, agreements must be achieved upon all 
the negotiation issues. Multiple issues can be negotiated concurrently by packaging one set of issues into a proposal 
(sent from the seller to buyer) or counter-proposal (sent from the buyer to seller). A negotiation sequence involving 
multiple concession rounds is composed of alternate placements of proposals and counter-proposals which have to 
be evaluated to decide their acceptability. Table 1 displays the expressions of related negotiation elements.  
Table 1. Negotiation element expressions 
Negotiation element Expression Example 
Issue ^ `   i negotiation issuesiI   ^ `, ,   i price, leadtime, qualityprice leadtime qualityI I I   
Issue value Seller:  itI s  t: the tth proposal 
Buyer:  itI b  t: the tth counter-proposal 
     1 1 1, ,price leadtime qualityI s I s I s   The 1st concession 
     1 1 1, ,price leadtime qualityI b I b I b   t=1 
Proposal 
Counter-proposal 
   it tP s I s  
   C b it tP b I  
       1 1 1 1, ,price leadtime qualityP s I s I s I s  
       1 1 1 1, ,price leadtime qualityCP b I b I b I b  
Negotiation sequence    ^ `,t tP s CP b             ^ `1 1 2 2 3 3, , , , , ,...P s CP b P s CP b P s CP b  
A convenient method to evaluate proposals and counter-proposals is to give a numerical score for each proposal 
and counter-proposal in the [0, 1] range. The numerical score can be perceived as the accumulated sum of individual 
scores for each negotiation issue. Among the negotiation issues, some quantitative issues are straightforward to 
obtain numerical scores. For instance, the value of lead time can be calculated as the amount of days. When the 
upper and lower value bounds are set, issue values can be normalized through the linear scoring function as in the 
second column in table 2. The expressions of scoring functions for benefit type issues (larger values are preferred) 
and cost type issues (smaller values are preferred) are differentiated. On the other hand, some qualitative issues are 
descriptive and not straightforward to be computed. Take the product quality as an example, different kinds of 
products may have different quality descriptions. For instances, textiles with higher density or higher ratio of natural 
fibre are considered to be of higher quality; while cast iron with lower deficiency is considered to be of higher 
quality. In this case, the issue values should belong to a finite set of descriptive options (e.g., when car’s color is a 
negotiation issue, its value set may include black, red and white). Then, the fuzzy method with triangular fuzzy set is 
employed to calculate numerical issue values and scores. Similar fuzzy methods have also been used in [9, 15]. The 
third column in table 2 gives the specification of the fuzzy method and scoring function for qualitative issues.  
Table 2. Specification of issue scoring functions 
 Quantitative issue Qualitative issue 
A finite set of descriptive options \ 1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }k mQ q q q q  
Scoring function for descriptive options \ : [0,1]V Q o  
A fuzzy set for qk \ A triangular number ( , , )k k ka b c  
Numerical issue value [min ,max ]i i itI   1 2 1 2[min{ , , , },max{ , , }]it m mI a a a c c c " "
Fuzzy membership function \ 
 
Scoring function 
  
( ) / ( )
( ) ( ) / ( )  
0           
k
i i
t k k k k t k
i i i
q t k t k k k t k
I a b a a I b
I c I c b b I c
otherwise
P
­   d °°   d ®°°¯
( ) ( ) ( )
k
k
i i
t q t k
q Q
V I I V qP

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To calculate the numerical score of a proposal or counter-proposal, each composition negotiation issue should be 
assigned a weight (wi). When a buyer evaluates a seller’s proposal, the numerical score can be expressed as equation 
(1) shows. A seller’s proposal is acceptable for the buyer if the score is no less than that of buyer’s counter-proposal. 
                           i itt
i
U P s w b V I u¦        ( 1)i
i
w b  ¦                                                             (1) 
2.2. Negotiation strategies and concession tactics 
Agents’ negotiation behaviors are governed by negotiation strategies. Game-theoretic based negotiation strategies 
have been explored to determine the optimal solution by analyzing the interaction as a game between identical 
participants and seeking its equilibrium [16, 17]. Most of these approaches assume that the space of negotiation 
issue values is completely known, however, this is not realistic in E-commerce negotiations where participants are 
reluctant to reveal all their compositions of negotiation issue values to their opponents. On the other hand, the space 
of negotiation issue values is infinite when consecutive issue values are involved (such as price), which will go 
beyond agents’ limited computation capabilities to determine the optimal solution. Therefore, the heuristic 
computing approach suggested by Faratin, Sierra and Jennings [1] is adopted to formulate the negotiation strategies 
through continuous concessions. The combination of concession tactics involving time-dependent, resource-
dependent and behavior-dependent tactics introduced in [1] is an applicable computational approach for the 
composition of negotiation strategies reflecting agents’ attitudes towards risks, time limits and resource availability. 
For the time-dependent concession tactic, time is the predominant factor used to decide how to make the 
concession. This tactic is based on continuous functions containing time variables. In the tth (t=1, 2, 3…) proposal or 
counter-proposal, the concession rate for issue Ii can be defined as: 
  
1
max
max
(1 )(( 1) / )      (0 1)
( )
exp 1 ( 1) / ln           ( 1)
i i
i
i
k k t t
t
t t k
E
E
ED E
­     d° ®   !°¯
                                                             (2) 
Based on this concession rate, the value of issue Ii in the tth proposal or counter-proposal can be expressed as: 
  
min ( )(max min )          
max ( )(max min )     
i i i
i i
t i i i
i
t Cost
I
t Benefit
D
D
­  ° ®  °¯                                                                  (3) 
In equation (2), maxt  is the maximum willing concession step. maxi  and min i  are the upper and lower value 
bounds of issue Ii. They can also be perceived as the reservation and aspiration issue values which are the least and 
best acceptable values respectively. In the commerce world, sellers usually make a higher discount on the initial 
proposal to smooth the following confronting, and then concede slowly. In the concession function, ik  reflects the 
discount rate. The variable ȕ influences the concession speed. When 0<ȕ<1, the concession speed is low in the 
initial stage, and then increases gradually. When ȕ=1, the concession speed is a constant. When ȕ>1, the concession 
speed is high in the initial stage, and then decreases gradually to a small value. 
The resource-dependent concession tactics generate issue values depending on how a particular resource is being 
consumed. As time can be seen as a kind of resource, the resource-dependent concession function can be illustrated 
in the same way as time-dependent concession tactics. 
The behavior-dependent concession tactics are also called imitative tactics. There are different approaches to 
imitate the opponent’s behavior, namely, relative tit-for-tat tactic, averaged tit-for-tat tactic and random absolute tit-
for-tat tactic [1]. The relative tit-for-tat tactic controls the imitation starting point and imitates the opponent’s 
concession behavior according to the relative change of the opponent’s previous two proposed issue values. 
A negotiation strategy is a combination of the concession tactics either in the form of direct weighted sum, or 
periodic change of different tactics. A feasible negotiation strategy should be able to achieve the negotiation 
agreement within the allowable negotiation time and resources. 
3. Adaptive Negotiation Behavior Configuration 
In agent-based E-commerce negotiations, software agents carry out negotiations on behalf of either buyers or 
sellers. Agents’ negotiation behaviors are configured firstly through the assignment of suitable negotiation strategies, 
and then may be adjusted by detecting opponents’ behaviors during the negotiation. After the negotiation, the 
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negotiation sequence has to be recorded. A three-staged adaptive behavior configuration mechanism is illustrated in 
figure 1. The mechanism is described from the buyer agent perspective, and is also applicable for the seller agent.  
 
Fig. 1. Adaptive negotiation behavior configuration framework 
3.1. Case-based pre-negotiation strategy assignment 
In the negotiation behavior configuration framework, negotiation strategies are assigned learning from previous 
negotiation experiences. When eliciting adoptable strategies from the negotiation case base, the negotiation 
environment similarity and negotiation strategy effectiveness are considered as two measures. Some environmental 
attributes are chosen to specify the negotiation environment, such as negotiation issue, issue value range, total 
number of negotiation participants and negotiation time limit. The negotiation strategy effectiveness can be 
measured by the individual utility gained from a negotiation (which is also the numerical score of the final proposal 
or counter-proposal). Then, a strategy selection indicator (SSI) can be calculated combining the above two measures. 
The lower section in figure 1 shows the strategy deployment procedure in the following 5 steps.  
Step 1: to determine the environmental attributes and historical individual utility.  
These data are recorded in the historical negotiation case base and can be directly retrieved.  
Step 2: to calculate individual environmental attribute similarities between the current and historical negotiations. 
The environmental attributes may involve quantitative and qualitative attributes. They can be expressed as: 
[min ,max ]qni qni qnix  : the range value of quantitative environmental attributes; 
1 2{ , , , }qli qli qli qlinx FV FV FV " : a set of fuzzy values of qualitative environmental attributes. 
For the environmental attribute i, the individual similarity between the current attribute value and the attribute 
value of the jth historical negotiation is defined as: 
For quantitative attributes: , | |1
max{ , }
j
j
j
HC
C H i i
i HC
i i
x x
Sim
x x
                                                       (4) 
For qualitative attributes: , 1
1 [ ]
j
j
j
H C
C H i i
i H C
i i
FV FV
Sim
FV FV otherwise
­ d° ®  °¯
                               (5) 
Step 3: to calculate the aggregated environment similarity.  
The negotiation environment similarity can be calculated as a weighted sum of all the individual similarities: 
, ,j jC H C H
i i
i
Sim w Sim u¦                                                                           (6) 
Step 4: to calculate the strategy selection indicator. 
The strategy selection indicator for the jth historical negotiation can be calculated as the weighted sum of 
individual utility (iu) and the aggregated environment similarity: 
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, jC H
j iu j simSSI w iu w Sim u  u                                                                       (7) 
Step 5: to select the maximum SSI value. 
After calculating the SSI values of all the historical negotiations, the one with the maximum SSI value can be 
determined. The negotiation strategy used in this negotiation will be assigned to the agent as the current strategy. 
3.2. Neural network-based negotiation behavior tracking 
The Back-Propagation Neural Network (BP_NN) learning model is used to track the negotiation opponent’s 
behavior. The fundamental logic is learning the opponent’s historical concession behaviors in the off-line learning 
module to establish the BP_NN structure, and then in the on-line learning module, using the BP_NN to detect the 
dynamic change of opponent’s behavior. The BP_NN can be trained using concession data series. Since the wide 
coverage of the data value scales may cause pattern confusion, the input data should be processed to eliminate that 
influence. Here, the input data are processed to be the ratio of difference between the successive raw concession data. 
The definition of the data is as follows. 
( )itI s : the value of negotiation issue I
i proposed by the seller at his concession step t, t =1, 2, 3…. 
1( ) ( )
i i i
t t tD I s I s   : the difference between two adjacent proposed values of issue Ii, also the concession value. 
1 1 1 2/ { ( ) ( ) } / { ( ) ( ) }
i i i i i i i
t t t t t t tR D D I s I s I s I s       : The ratio of difference. 
Three concession trends can be learned in the BP_NN covering general attitudes towards risks, namely, risk 
prone (P), risk averse (A) and risk neutral (N). For the risk prone type, the concession speed is in a decreasing 
manner, agents concede aggressively at the start in order to reach the agreement as early as possible. For the risk 
averse type, agents keep a slow concession speed at the start to avoid the rapid benefit losing, and the concession 
speed is in an increasing manner. For the risk neutral type, agents always concede at a constant concession speed. 
The parameter settings of the BP_NN are described in table 3. The network structure is of 4 input nodes, 12 
hidden nodes and 4 output nodes. The input node x_in0 represents the concession stage and is counted from 0.01. 
The input nodes x_in1, x_in2, x_in3 are three successive ratios of difference. When there is a new ratio of difference 
input, the concession stage will move forward by an increment of 0.01. The output node y_out0 is the predicted 
following ratio of difference. The output nodes y_out1, y_out2 and y_out3 perform as a concession type classifier. (1, 
0, 0), (1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) stand for the risk averse, risk prone and risk neutral concession type respectively.  
Table 3. BP_NN parameter settings 
Parameter Setting 
Network structure 4-12-4 
x_in0 concession stage 
x_in1, x_in2, x_in3 Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2 
y_out0 Rt+3 
y_out1 concession type classifier        (1,0,0)ÆA 
y_out2 concession type classifier        (1,1,0)ÆP 
y_out3 concession type classifier        (0,0,1)ÆN 
Activation function in input layer f(x)=x 
Activation function in hidden and output layers -( ) 1 / (1 )xf x e   
Performance measure 
(m training samples, q output nodes) 
11
2
0 0
( _ ( ) _ ( )) /
qm
o o
k o
RMSE d out k y out k mq

  
 ¦¦  ( oout_d : desired output) 
In the on-line learning phase, the BP_NN structure trained in off-line learning is used to predict the opponent’s 
concession behavior and detect the changes of its concession functions. The behavior tracking logic is presented in 
figure 2. When confronting with a negotiation opponent in a new negotiation sequence, the opponent’s proposed 
issue values are input into the BP_NN and then processed. For multi-issue negotiations, values of each issue are 
input into a separated BP_NN, and the concession functions of each issue can be detected in parallel. Since the 
output is still a ratio of difference, it should be converted back to the predicting issue value. 
The relative difference between the predicted issue value and the actual issue value is computed to determine if 
there is fluctuation of the opponent’s concession behavior. If some fluctuation has been detected, the opponent may 
probably change the concession function, and a new round of detecting and predicting will be conducted to capture 
the dynamic changes. For the three output nodes of the concession type classifier, if at least two nodes are stable 
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(being close to 0 or 1 in a continuous manner), the concession trend can be identified to be similar to the concession 
functions in the negotiation case base. Otherwise, an unfamiliar new concession function may be encountered.  
 
Fig. 2. Negotiation behavior tracking logic 
3.3. Negotiation behavior recording 
When a negotiation ends, all the opponent’s proposed issue values will be summarized as a new concession time 
series. The difference between the shapes of the new time series curve (C) and a historical concession curve (Hj) can 
be calculated as a similarity measure. Supposing the total concession steps taken in a historical negotiation and new 
negotiation are TH and TC respectively. TH and TC can be divided into N time segments with each time segment 
involving TH/N and TC/N steps of concession respectively. In each time segment, the concession curve can be 
approximated to a straight line shaped by the starting and ending issue values. The slope of the straight line in the ith 
time segment can be expressed as equation (8) for C and Hj respectively (symbol I represents the issue value): 
( 1)
/
C C
C C
T T
i i
C N N
i
C
I I
k
T N
  

  and ( 1)
/
j j
H H
j
H H
T T
i iH N N
i
H
I I
k
T N
  

                                                            (8) 
Then the similarity measure (S) of C and Hj is the mean square deviation of Cik and Hik as equation (9) shows.  
   
2
1
( )j
j
N
HC
i i
H i
C
k k
S
N
 

 
¦
                                                                             (9) 
For the similarity measure between C and each Hj, if none of the jHCS is smaller than 1, it shows that the new 
concession time series is of apparent difference comparing with all the historical concession functions. Therefore, 
the new concession time series should be recorded, and the BP_NN needs to be trained again for updating. 
4. Testing and Experiments 
4.1. Training and testing of the BP_NN 
There are 440 initial training samples for the BP_NN. They are selected based on the time-dependent concession 
functions introduced in section 2.2 covering seven functions with various values of max {50,100}t  , {1/ 20,1 / 3,1,3, 20}E  , 
0.1ik  , max 300i   and min 100i  . Although the training samples are limited, they can reflect the typical concession 
trends of risk neutral concession tactic with constant concession speed (ȕ=1), risk averse concession tactics with 
increased concession speeds (0<ȕ<1) and risk prone concession tactics with decreased concession speeds (ȕ>1). 
After 657,548 epochs of training, the training error (RMSE) is less than 0.01 and the network weights and threshold 
bias are determined. 
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To test the adaptability of the learning model, the testing data include time-dependent concession functions with 
different parameter settings and random concession patterns with and without regular trends. For the time-dependent 
concession testing data, three functions (a-c) with diversities of parameter settings are randomly chosen (as in table 
4). For the random concession testing data, random concession values are generated by the Java random method in 
each concession step. These values may be generated in a totally random manner without any regular trends, or they 
can be relative random numbers following a general increased or decreased speed trend.  
Table 4. Parameter settings of the testing time-dependent concession functions 
 Concession type maxt  E  ki maxi mini 
a risk neutral 20 1 0.05 5 2 
b risk averse 12 0.5 0.16 150 135 
c risk prone 80 6 0.28 2000 1500 
For the time-dependent concession testing, the deviations between the predicting values and the actual values are 
quite small. For the random concession testing, figure 3 displays four examples of the concession curves and the 
related predicting curves from the BP_NN. For graphs 3(a)-3(c), the random concession values are controlled to go 
along the increase, decrease or a hybrid speed trend. For graph 3(d), the concession values are totally random values 
between 0 and 10. Table 5 shows the first 10 actual concession values of 3(b) and 3(d) as an example. For random 
concessions with trends (3(a)-3(c)), the general trends can be tracked while some predicting values are of obvious 
deviations from actual values, that is because the random values are not smooth enough to form the trends as strict 
concession functions. For random concessions without regular trends (3(d)), the predicting values are in disorder.  
 
 (a) increase                                      (b) decrease                                 (c) decrease-increase                                (d) random 
Fig. 3. The comparison of predicting issue values and actual issue values for random concessions 
Table 5. The examples of random concession values 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
b 10.10785 10.0608 10.03223 10.03174 10.01133 4.345534 4.234194 4.118923 4.0902 4.081664
d 6.711582 5.368028 9.315115 6.353309 2.489479 9.546816 3.714945 6.597773 1.574748 8.457714
Figure 4 shows the concession type predicting results for the four random concession examples. Although the 
predicting results are not stable along the whole concession sequence, there are still subtle clues to identify the 
random concession trends. For the random concessions with trends, the relatively stable phases of the predicting 
results can figure out the periodic increase or decrease trend. While for the random concessions without trends, it is 
much difficult to identify the successive stable phase. If this phenomenon of chaos happens, it can be inferred that 
the negotiation opponent’s concession is in a totally random manner.  
 
 (a) increase                                        (b) decrease                                  (c) decrease-increase                             (d) random 
Fig. 4. The plotting of predicting concession types for random concessions 
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From the testing results of both the time-dependent concession functions and random concession patterns, it can 
be seen that the trends of the opponent’s concession behavior can be captured by the BP_NN model regardless of a 
strict concession function or a random concession pattern being used. 
4.2. An agent computational negotiation example 
A two-issue buyer-seller negotiation case is implemented according to the computational method using JADE 
(Java agent development environment). Considering the multi-issue negotiation scenario, both the quantitative 
negotiation issue (unit price: up) and qualitative issue (quality level: ql) are involved in the experimental case. 
Firstly, the qualitative issue needs to be quantified for computing. Table 6 shows the quantification method in 
accordance with the introduction in section 2.1. The parameter settings of the experiment are described in table 7. In 
this case, both the buyer and seller agents use time-dependent concession functions, the seller agent will change its 
concession function parameters at its concession step t=20. The buyer agent can detect the changes of the seller’s 
concession function and adjust its concession function parameters accordingly.  
Table 6. Quantification method for the qualitative issue (quality level) 
 Buyer Seller 
Descriptive options {Level1, Level2, Level3} {Level1, Level2, Level3} 
Scores for descriptive options {1, 0.7, 0.2} {0.3, 0.6, 1} 
Fuzzy sets for descriptive options {(1,1,2), (1.5,2.5,3.5), (3,4,4)} {(2,2,3), (2.5,3.5,4.5), (4,5,5)} 
Issue value range [1, 4] [2, 5] 
Fuzzy membership functions 
1
2    1 <2
( )
0          otherwise
ql ql
ql t t
Level t
I I
IP ­  d° ®°¯  
2
1.5   1.5 <2.5
( ) 3.5    2.5 <3.5
0                    otherwise
ql ql
t t
ql ql ql
Level t t t
I I
I I IP
­  d°  d®°¯
 
3
3   3 <4
( )
0          otherwise
ql ql
ql t t
Level t
I I
IP ­  d° ®°¯  
1
3    2 <3
( )
0           otherwise
ql ql
ql t t
Level t
I I
IP ­  d° ®°¯  
2
2.5   2.5 <3.5
( ) 4.5    3.5 <4.5
0                    otherwise
ql ql
t t
ql ql ql
Level t t t
I I
I I IP
­  d°  d®°¯
 
3
4   4 <5
( )
0           otherwise
ql ql
ql t t
Level t
I I
IP ­  d° ®°¯  
Table 7. Experimental parameter settings 
 Buyer  Seller  
Issue Unit price Quality level Unit price Quality level 
Weight 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.3 
Issue range [150,300] [1,4] [180,320] [2,5] 
tmax 100 100 100 100 
Starting concession function ȕ=0.5, kup=0.1 ȕ=2, kql=0.001 ȕ=1, kup=0.15 ȕ=1, kql=0 
Changed concession function ȕ=1/3, kup=0.1 ȕ=1, kql=0.001 ȕ=1/3, kup=0.15 ȕ=0.5, kql=0 
Changing point t=32 t=32 t=20 t=20 
Utility scoring function (300 ) / (300 150) 0.8 ( ) 0.2up qlt tI V I  u  u  ( 180) / (320 180) 0.7 ( ) 0.3up qlt tI V I  u  u  
The final negotiation results of two comparison experiments are shown in table 8. The utilities are compared 
between negotiations with and without buyer’s dynamic detecting and adjustment of concession tactics. It can be 
observed from the outcomes that the buyer win higher utility if it tracks the opponent’s concession behavior and 
adjust its own concession functions accordingly. At this point, the functioning of the computational negotiation is 
clarified. The negotiation power of the buyer agent can actually be enhanced through the tracking and adaptive 
adjustment of negotiation behaviors.  
Table 8. The comparison of negotiation results 
 Mutual accepted proposal Buyer utility Seller utility Concession steps taken 
Without dynamic detection CP(b)75=<240.94, 2.948> <240.94, Level2> 0.3923 0.3900 75 
With dynamic detection CP(b)78=<230.47, 2.979> <230.47, Level2> 0.4438 0.4349 78 
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5. Conclusions
Agent technologies are being explored to automate E-commerce negotiations. As computational entities, agents 
carry out negotiations based on some computation model. This paper provides a computational method to organize 
agent-based E-commerce negotiations with adaptive negotiation behaviors. Negotiation issues and strategies are 
expressed in a computational pattern. Agents’ negotiation behaviors are configured and tracked through a three-
staged mechanism involving the case-based pre-negotiation strategy assignment, the neural network-based 
negotiation behavior tracking and the time series-based post-negotiation data recording. Through this mechanism, 
agents’ negotiation behaviors can be deployed in a more adaptive and flexible manner. The computational 
negotiation method has been implemented using an assumed two-issue buyer-seller negotiation case. Observing 
from the experimental results, the buyer can actually win more benefit if the opponent’s negotiation behavior is 
tracked at runtime. At this stage, the computational model configures the essential negotiation functionality of an 
individual agent, for the future, the allocation of the agent system in both business and customer ends will be 
specified with more real-life application considerations. Meanwhile, more negotiation concession patterns and 
dynamics will be explored to further test the adaptability of the negotiation behavior tracking and recording 
mechanisms.  
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